Introduction

20
As an essential feature to enable rail operational flexibility, railway turnouts are special track systems 21 used to divert a train from a particular direction or a particular track onto other directions or other 22 tracks. It is a structural grillage system that assembles steel rails, points (or called 'switches'), 23 crossings (or called 'frogs'), steel plates, rubber pads, insulators, fasteners, screw spikes, beam bearers 24 (either timber, polymer, steel or concrete), ballast and formation. A railway turnout is a must-have 25 structure in railway corridor whose crossing imparts a significant discontinuity in the rail running 26 surface. It is important to note that its structure and components pose different risk profiles to railway 27 operations. High demand in railway operation, the railway operators have to increase the axle load, 28 traffic density and speed of the operations. The dynamic wheel/rail interaction on such imperfect 29 contact transfer can cause detrimental impact loads on railway track and its components. The transient 30 vibration could also affect surrounding building structures. In addition, the large impact emits 31 disturbing noises to railway neighbours. Railway turnouts are one of the highest percentages 32 contributing railway infrastructure component failure. 33
Although the safety of railway systems is relatively high and is continually being improved, a 34 considerable number of severe accidents still occur globally. The total number of train accidents for 35 the last five years (2009 to 2014) in the EU has been reported as around 12,000. Derailment is 36 illustrated to be the most occurring type of accident, accounting for almost 9% of the total [1] . 37
Derailments have been estimated to cost all EU member states more than 200 million Euros annually 38
[2]. Financial losses frequently result from damage to wagons or railway components or operational 39
shutdown. In addition to financial losses, even if the number of fatalities and injuries appears low, it 40 can be said that fatalities still result from extreme disasters, such as the derailment of a fuel wagon at 41
Viareggio in 2009, causing 34 fatalities. A recent research reveals an average of 3.9 fatalities per year 42 resulting from various derailing incidents across the EU [3] .
whether an accident is an unplanned event, the term 'incident' is sometimes used to express such 99 events where no injury occurs [13] However, incidents are generally seen as wake-up calls that could 100 alert supervisors and employees to risks or hazards that they had previously not considered while risk 101 is the chance that a hazard will give rise to an accident, which results in causalities such as property 102 damage or financial or life loss [14] . 103
The structure of the overall risk management process is illustrated in Fig. 1 
System definition and hazard identification
121
The overall approach of hazard identification in railway industry is a deductive process by which 122 possible events are imagined [16] . This process is highly likely to rely on the experience and 123 qualifications of the analysts [17] . There are a number of possible ways to support the process; 124
Brainstorming is the simplest way to identify hazards through which a simple list of hazards is 125
produced. This kind of identification concentrates on identifying imaginable and unimaginable 126 hazards within the scope of the domain of the particular concept of railway operation or systems [18] . 127
The new hazard types in railway industry aren't generally expected to emerge as the industry uses 128 almost the same systems for a long time and, as a result, has well-known the common types hazards. 129
One of the reason for this is the industry largely relies on checklists for a particular case. General 130 experience from various organisation, stakeholders is gathered to build checklists which often consists 131 of generic hazards or areas where it is particularly significant to pay attention hazards [19] . 132
The two can be combine each other to predict the hazards. This approach is called as what-if, 133 generation of scenarios. Besides being an informal method for identifying hazards, it might be quite 134 often used in railway design projects for financial matters rather than accidents [20] . 135 identification and failure modes, considering deviations applied to predetermined keywords 137 describing railway components, system, process or operations being performed [21] . 138
Risk analyses 139
Risk matrix 140
The risk matrix approach is often semi-quantitative and referred to as preliminary risk analysis. The 141 approach is easy to use and perform properly, provided that the following drawbacks are resolved [22] 142  calibration for intended application is required; 143  the parameters, such as likelihood and frequency, are based on subjective definitions, which 144 could result in comprehending complexities; 145  the risk results are only reasonable for systems to which the risk matrices can be applied. 146
In order to properly conduct a risk analysis based on risk matrix, the three steps, Determine the 147 possible consequences, Likelihood of occurrence and Risk scoring matrix should be followed [23] . 148
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 149
This is a qualitative method, due to its inductive nature, which aims to identify potential failure modes 150 of the components and to analyse the effects of those failure modes in an engineering system [24, 25] . 151
The system components to analyse individually could be selected according to the degree of disability 152 of system operation or by accidents with significant external consequences. Whilst a single system 153 component is considered at a time, the other components are assumed to work at the same time [26] . 154
As a result, FMEA is asserted as not fit for critical combinations of component failures [27] . 155
The analysis proceeds as follows: 156  Break down the system into independent subsystems; 157 constitutes the system at any given moment of time, while the latter governs the changes of a state that 195 happen within a system. 196
Hazard Function -HF 197
It has been seen that Hazard Function (failure rate) can be applied satisfactorily in the railway and 198 transportation sectors [33] . It is a function showing the probability of railway components, system, 199 process or operation failure at time `t` given these are functioning up to time `t`. 200
Bayesian Analysis 201
The striking difference between Bayesian and frequentist methods is in the definition of probability 202
[34]. According to a frequentist, probability is considered as a long-run frequency. In other words, it 203 is asserted that the probability of a fair coin toss landing heads up is half of the whole possibility, 0.5, 204 in the long run. Conversely, a Bayesian expresses a belief in the degree that the coin lands heads. This 205 definition of probability is often termed subjective probability. While probability is used by a 206 frequentist to express the frequency of certain types, which happens over repeated trials, a Bayesian, 207 in practice, uses it to express belief in a statement about unknown quantities [35] . 208
In Bayes Analysis (BA), when further information is provided, the structure of the model can be 209 updated [36] . This feature may be helpful, as the statistical uncertainty is largely present and the 210 amount of available data is sparse. The other advantage of BA is to integrate experimental data with 211 reliability data at all available levels through Bayes' theorem [37] . The theorem underlies how to 212 update beliefs for prior probabilities.
with a random selection from the input distributions for each variable. The outcomes of these 218 numerous scenarios might give a most likely case to approximate the probability of certain outcomes, 219 as well as a statistical distribution to reveal the risk or uncertainty involved [39] . 220
Comparative Evaluations and Discussions
221
To assess emerging risks in the railway sector, a large number of possible risk analysis methods 222 applicable for a turnout have been comprehensively reviewed and critically discussed in this paper. 223
This research is significant and cannot be matched by simple multiple-criterion decision making 224 framework, without the insights into multi-layer asset vulnerabilities derived from expert opinions. As 225 some of the methods depend largely on statistical techniques, a set of illustrative examples has been 226 given to understand their characteristics in order to deal with the variables for analysis. Additionally, 227 the limitations of the presented methods are discussed through the paper. 228
One of the problems is that analysis is often of scarce, incomplete or, sometimes even has missing 229 data [40] . The weakness in building a satisfying database arises mainly from building new lines, the 230 new materials used in railway tech, and climate and traffic density changes over the years [41] . As a 231
result, many precise safety estimates for the ensuing years need to be carried out, as many of the 232 changes mentioned above have already occurred or will. 233
These changes have been seen to give rise to component failure rates due to lack of precise 234 maintenance strategies based on insufficient risk analysis techniques. In the case of complex and 235 sparse data, it is argued that quantitative based methods, e.g. Monte Carlo or Hazard Function, should 236 be chosen to provide better information of possible risk factors and their consequences [42, 43] . In 237 contrast to a deterministic approach, the well-built stochastic approaches of MC and HF might allow 238 railway operators to eliminate undesirable time and financial losses. This is because the probabilisticengineering systems such as switch blade of a turnout. The blade mechanism often requires an intense 241 care and maintenance as its geometry generally tends to be changed in use. 242
Furthermore, a recent study [44] has illustrated that such methods have another advantage over others 243 for any type of infrastructure, particularly large scale systems, man-made, networked and operated 244 from long distance, since their results provide much more solid information on total system 245 vulnerability as a function of the input variables. 246
Considering the above papers and their conclusions, their methods could be well-adapted into any risk 247 analysis attempt at understanding to what degree each component of a turnout system could have an 248 effect on the safe passage of wagons through the turnout. This kind of research should be directed at 249 optimising the maintenance intervals of system components in a particular type of the turnout. 250
Considering how different is each response to safety failures, consequently contributing to the overall 251 system vulnerability of the turnout, stochastic modelling using one of the two approaches is likely to 252 suit. 253
However, the core problem of object-oriented modelling for complex engineering systems is related 254 to slow simulation speed and the large number of input parameters [45] . Additionally, the authors 255 prescribe that the sub-systems of a turnout should be taken into specific account in the railway 256 industry risk management chain. Instead, the industry currently often prefers to accept the system as 257 whole or simply classify it as crossing and switch [46] . From this perspective, these kinds of 258 classifications make investigating risks and vulnerabilities inadequate and they need to evolve to 259 approach sound estimates. Such an evolution would be able to take measures against risk and 260 vulnerabilities due to a better understanding of how these arise in the complexity of turnout systems. 261
The importance of ensuring how accurate and appropriate data are collected is vital. Given the 262 subsystem levels of a railway turnout as the aim of the risk assessment study, it is expected to have 263 two possible sources of data which might be used for the assessment: 1) data through the analysis of 264 similar railway systems, such as crossing, and then allocation/contribution of failures to the 265 subsystems of a turnout, and 2) data through elements and components of the subsystems of a turnout 266
[47]. The latter is known as the bottom-up approach, while the former is the top-down approach. It is 267 significant to underline that this classification is based, not on the organisation of the data, but the 268 source of the data. 269
A failure to display signals at a turnout is a good example of this as the top-event probability in a fault 270 tree model. If the logical aggregate of turnout subsystems related to signalling process estimates a 271 failure, then it should be considered a bottom-up approach. On the other hand, if a failure to display 272 signals is based on observation, e.g. the identification of procedural faults, and if the basic event 273
probabilities, e.g. human-oriented operational failure of signalling, are the sole allocation of top-event 274
probability based on various criteria, then the same FT model would be considered a top-down 275
approach. 276
The results of these two approaches are highly likely to vary in the same study. Effort in deciding the 277 structure of the study could be unrealistic. ASA`s recent study of a complex engineering system [47] 278 revealed that a sound estimation might be achieved with the application of both to a study, and then 279 the aggregate of the study outcomes and overall failure probability can be reached using techniques 280 such as Monte Carlo. 281
Expert review is still one of the essential elements in understanding risk components in railway 282 studies [48] . In the literature, it is noticed that over 500 railway review-based risk analysis or 283 management articles, reports and conference proceedings appear to have been published since 2010. to determine what is needed, e.g. safety requirement in this case. Therefore, the final output comprises 324 the assumptions on which the analysis rests, which may result in SAR (safety-related application 325 rules) and HR (hazard rates) related to the functional failures (as hazards) of the technical system. 326 Some methods take proactively preventative measures, whereas others, e.g. ETA, do not. For 327 instance, the focus of FTA is on provision against multiple causes leading to a number of undesired 328 events. In other words, the events are likely to occur in the future and the probability of their 329 occurrences is assumed to be reduced through FTA. On the other hand, the focus of ETA could be on 330 mitigation measures leading to multiple consequences after any event occurs. Hence, the use of failure 331 tracing methods is widely different from one to the other, since actions are taken either actively or 332 proactively. 333
In fact, the two are complementary and are generally used together by focusing on opposite sides of 334 an undesired event. 335
Figure 3 Bow-tie technique
337
The figure above shows how they fit together. This is often called the bow-tie technique. Only a 338 single 'undesired event' is shown in the figure; in the reality of the railway sector, multiple causes are 339 highly likely to result in many different events, initially, each then escalating with multiple 340 consequences. Each event can be analysed through FTA and ETA. In a nutshell, ETA is interested in 341 stopping an event escalating, whereas FTA is concerned with analysing faults which could lead to it 342 happening. Both can be applied qualitatively or, if data are available and satisfying, quantitatively. 343
The bow-tie could be used successfully to access the adequacy of controls and identify areas for risk 344 reduction in properly operating railway turnouts. The aim could be to test the robustness and number 345 of existing safeguards and identify improvements. 346
For instance, the technique might be useful for risk assessment of driver-to-signaller train radio 347 communication system failures which are responsible for derailments at the turnouts, as stated in the 348 second section. It inherently has a graphical representation, which might result in easy understanding 349 of the relationships between the causes of unwanted events and their control. The assessment is highly 350 likely to identify procedural controls, along with integrity and functional requirements, and establish 351 issues requiring information, assessment or action where the effectiveness of a control might be 352
questioned. 353
However, the bow-tie might not be the panacea for all risk management problems. decomposing a system into subsystems and basic elements. Investigating risks for a turnout system 359 with strong interdependencies in nature has to go beyond the convention cause-consequence analysis 360 in order to concentrate on spill-over clusters of failures. Indeed, the sum of the behaviour of 361 individual components in a turnout cannot be expected to describe implicitly the behaviour of the 362 whole system. This renders questionable the suitability of such risk analysis techniques. Moreover, 363 pre-defined causal chains, e.g. defined by ETA, are likely to be inappropriate to identify hidden risks. 364
It is ultimately worth noting that each technique might provide different parameters or outputs that 365 may be particularly useful regarding intended solutions of the problem. Therefore, a risk analysis 366 method should be chosen, not only based on hazard, but also the consideration of the capabilities of 367 each technique. Additionally, despite the models being at system levels, the LUQRA quantifies first at the system and 392 then at line-level, considering line-specific factors, and, lastly, aggregates the line representations of 393 risk to the overall system representation, whereas the other begins with the whole system 394 representation and then disaggregates it to reach risk representations for individual routes [66] [67] [68] . 395
The models take into account: train accidents, including collusion and derailment, movement 396 accidents, including various interfacing problems, and other malicious non-movement accidents. 397
However, the RSSB SRM does not inherently include accidents most seen in underground lines, such 398 as flooding and arching, whereas the LUQRA does. 399
Furthermore, the data used by the both models, is: 1) derived from historic data; 2) normalised per 400 relevant unit of railway activity; 3) evaluated to make a decision on whether changes in the railway or 401 its operation may have influenced the normalised rate of occurrence of such events; and 4) multiple 402 backups of current relevant volumes concerning railway activity to achieve the best estimation of 403 forecasting the frequency of such an event today. However, in the RSSB SRM, database updates are 404 carried out more often and its database covers a shorter time period. respectively. This pessimistic attribute of the LU QRA can be explained by: 1) risk models of 416 included top events not having been updated for some time; 2) the statistical data applied in 417 quantifying the model being derived from longer time periods than tend to be used by RSSB; 3) 418 beginning with a picture of the whole system and then disaggregating it, which could be somehow 419 more beneficial for complex scenarios. 420
On the other hand, both models provide a distorted picture of risk, mainly arising from the following 421 concerns: 1) incompleteness -leaving out rare but significant events previously experienced in the 422 UK; 2) limited database -using only own database; 3) backward looking -addressing only past events 423 rather than predicting and integrating current underlying risk; 4) uncalibrated process -leading to 424 under-estimating or consistently over-estimating safety risks. 425
To address these in turn: where the models might be incomplete and limited, global events can be 426 incorporated into their database with proper modelling to obtain UK-appropriate estimates of 427 frequencies and consequences. As regards backward looking, the models make an assessment of risk, 428 doing a scale up/down of current incident rates through multiplication of current activity volumes 429 with recent normalised rates. Although RSSB might occasionally make changes to the recently 430 observed rate, both may need to identify the sensitivity of risk to various aspects of safety 431 performance improvement in accordance with their activities. As regards the data calibration of the 432 
Concluding Remark
439
Railway turnout is a complex system, which is used to divert a train from one track to another. Its 440 geometry and gradient constraints make it one of the most critical railway infrastructures. Significant 441 complexity of railway turnout results in emerging risks during rail operations. This has been proven 442 by a large number of train derailments at or nearby railway turnouts and crossings. Such incidents 443 cause operational downtime and financial losses, and sometimes the loss of lives. The proper 444 estimation of the high level of risk posed by railway turnout systems is essential for companies and 445 organisations in order to operate the entire railway system without any safety concerns. With the 446 increasing interest in railway transportation, the risk in railway turnout systems as a most problematic 447 one, one which might be expected to increase and require more complex analysis. 448
This review paper assists in evaluating the existing understanding and practices of risk analysis and 449 modelling, and in revealing the gaps in the industry. It has been seen that the industry uses a wide 450 range of risk analysis modelling and gains different outcomes. Research showed that railway industry 451 needs to pay special attention to monitor and manage interconnected risks, in order to improve public 452 safety and operational reliability. The paper thus presents the state-of-the-art risk management 453 techniques considering systems thinking approach, diversity of emerging risks and variety of risk 454 analysis methodologies. Comparative evaluation of the techniques has been comprehensively 455 discussed with relation to railway incidents. The practical guidelines have been summarised for 456 railway practitioners so that risk management processes can be enhanced for rail transport with 457 special respect to railway switches and crossings. As a complex system, a railway turnout is evaluated 458 to be appropriately fitted for downward models. Furthermore, it has been found out that there are 459 many problems updating existing risk levels and model calibration. Solutions to these, such as 460 integration of databases, calibration, etc. can be recommended, but their impacts and significance 461 require further research. 462
There is no question that risk analysing, modelling and management of railway systems provide an 463 invaluable tool for railway companies and organisations to forecast various scenarios and thenupdating process whereby a large number of outputs in each particular case is obtained by 469 using many different methods and inputs, and then comparing the outputs with reality 470 annually to optimise and calibrate the expectation. 
